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Corporate Takeovers
Who Wins; Who Loses;
Who Should Regulate?
John C. Coffee, Jr., Joseph A. Grundfest,
Roberta Romano, and Murray L. Weidenbaum

On December 3, 1987, during its 11th Annual Policy Conference in Washington, DC, the American
Enterprise Institute convened a panel discussion
on "Corporate Takeovers and Insider Trading:
Who Should Regulate?" The panelists were John
C. Coffee, Jr., professor of law at Columbia University; Joseph A. Grundfest, commissioner at the
Securities and Exchange Commission; Roberta
Romano, professor of law at Yale Law School;
and Murray L. Weidenbaum, Mallinckrodt Distinguished University Professor and director of the
Center for the Study of American Business at
Washington University. The panel was moderated
by Christopher C. DeMuth, president of AEI. The
following discussion is drawn from these
proceedings.
PROE WEIDENBAUM: How should we regard
takeovers? The prevailing view in the scholarly
literature is that takeovers of major American
corporations yield positive results because the
shareholders usually benefit. I disagree.
Most economic studies of takeovers fail to
answer, or even to ask, whether the new company performs better than did the separate parts.
Those few that have tried to answer this question
have concluded that takeovers are harmful.
Most scholarly studies focus on what happens to the market value of the target companies. Not surprisingly, the price of the target

company's stock invariably rises during the takeover battle. On reflection, would we expfct anything else? After all, what serious raider would
try to acquire stock by offering less than the market price?
But the prevailing view in the economics literature goes beyond a restatement of the obvious. It also makes an heroic assumption: that the
value of the target company rises because the
new management is likely to manage more effectively than the old. Unfortunately this assumption is often mistaken for irrefutable fact. Why is
it irrefutable? Not because empirical studies
demonstrate the point. There is little evidence
that tenderers have managed the businesses they
acquired any more profitably than their peers or
their predecessors. Rather, the presumption of
greater productivity is supposedly irrefutable because it is the only conclusion consistent with
the efficient-market hypothesis.
It is premature to conclude that stockholders generally benefit from takeovers. After all,
for each seller there is a buyer. What happens to
the stock of the firm that does the taking over?
The answer to this question is downplayed in the
takeover literature because the stock price of the
acquiring firm usually declines after the merger
is announced-sometimes substantially (between 5 and 42 percent) and sometimes imperceptibly (3 percent or less). All sorts of apologies
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are made for this inconvenient conclusion. Inevitably, some question the statistical methodology
used, although it is the same as that used for the
enthusiastically embraced findings that the share
prices of target firms rise. In fact, the two sets of
findings come from the very same researchers in
the very same studies.
The widely held belief that shareholders generally benefit from takeovers does not withstand
close scrutiny. There are winners and losers. But
the results are counterintuitive: the owners of
the "winning" firm-the buyers-lose; the owners of the "losing" firm-the sellers-win.
Furthermore, it is not clear that the takeover
process benefits society. Of the studies that show
the dollar amounts of the gains and losses to
both groups of shareholders, several show net
gains, and several show net losses. But few of
these results are statistically different from zero.
Thus one need not quarrel with the efficientmarket hypothesis or with "event studies" to
conclude that little net social benefit seems to
accrue from the entire takeover process.
Many members of Congress are concerned
over what they view as a rising trend of hostile
mergers. Representative Peter Rodino, chairman
of the House Judiciary Committee, for example,
stated, "I think it is time for Congress to send a
clear signal to corporate America that we will no
longer tolerate unrestrained warfare between
top managements for control of corporate assets."
But if we have learned anything from the
long history of government regulation of business, it is that when Uncle Sam intervenes in internal business decision making, he usually does
more harm than good. Regulation is likely to
generate serious and often unexpected side effects-the "government failure" that so frequently accompanies attempts to deal with
"market failure."
My preference is neither for new laws nor
for a do-nothing approach. The proper answer to
corporate takeovers can be found in the corporation itself.
In addition to "takeover artists" and "entrenched managers," there is a third private-sector force battling for corporate control, the
firms' own boards of directors. These boards are
elected to represent the shareholders. Their
most important, but rarely performed, duty is to
say no. The board of a bidding firm should oppose a prospective merger that would, over the
long run, dilute the earnings of existing share24
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holders and, in the short run, reduce the market
value of their shareholdings. Similarly the board
of a target firm must decide when an offer for the
corporation's shares is sufficiently attractive to
accept over the protestation of the existing management.
If the raiders are opportunists, then management and boards of directors have given them
the opportunity. The record is clear: if the board
will not make the difficult choices that enhance
the value of the corporation, the takeover artists
will. Takeover mania is not a cause but a symptom of the unmet challenge. The complaisant director has not totally vanished from the boardroom. However, the increasing frequency of
shareholder derivative suits to challenge board
decisions makes future decisions less likely to be
based on management's preferences.
PROF. COFFEE: Murray Weidenbaum has
raised a valid point about takeover gains. He is
concerned that takeovers may represent little
more than wealth transfers from bidder shareholders to target shareholders, with no net increase in wealth. He points to studies by others
that suggest that bidders lose significantly, and
that since bidders are often much larger than target firms, there are likely to be net losses.
This is arguable. In fact, it has been argued
for some time. But it is also susceptible to empirical resolution. We need data not only on the
aggregate gains or losses to bidders or targets,
but also on the gains or losses to matched pairs
of bidders and targets. These data have only recently become available. In a recent study Michael Bradley, Anand Desai, and E. Han Kim of
the University of Michigan Business School examine the combined wealth effects for all takeovers in which the bidder and the target were
publicly held and for which data on stock prices
were available. This is a set of 236 matched pairs
between 1962 and 1984.
Bradley, Desai, and Kim find that over the
entire period, the combined value of target and
bidder firms increased by about 7.5 percent. In
three out of four cases, the gains exceeded the
losses. This leaves one out of four cases in which
the net impact of the takeover was negative,
meaning the shareholders of the bidder lost
more than the shareholders of the target gained.
The average dollar gain per takeover over the
whole period was $117 million.
Even more interesting than the aggregate
data is the breakdown into time periods. During
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the 1960s, acquiring firms made statistically significant gains from takeovers. During the 1970s,
however, they made no statistically significant
gains or losses.
What has happened in the 1980s? From 1981
to 1984, for the 52 matched pairs, the combined
value of bidder and target firms increased by 8
percent, or $219 million per takeover. This
higher average gain reflects the larger size of targets. The most interesting finding is that bidders
are incurring statistically significant losses:
about 3 percent of their market value, or about
$27 million per takeover.
The evidence is clear. That bidders currently
lose from takeovers is not a myth. In only about
35 percent of the cases do bidders break even or
do better. In nearly two-thirds of the cases, bidders' stock tends to go down. Still, over the entire period, the net effect of takeovers is strongly
positive. Although some shareholders lose, on
average, takeovers help shareholders.
I think it is a mistake to focus on bidder
shareholders versus target shareholders. Shareholders hold diversified portfolios. They do not

Isn't it curious that the new state statutes
give target shareholders more protection, when the only victim is the bidder
shareholder?

know whether they are going to hold stock in a
target or in a bidder; because they are diversified, they know that, on balance, they will do
well.
The pattern of gains and losses is also very
unstable. One would not expect the world to remain in one position forever, with bidders regularly losing two-thirds of the time, and target
shareholders regularly reaping very large gains.
One would expect the world to change in many
ways, possibly with takeover pressure beginning
to focus on unsuccessful bidders.
Moreover, if bidders lose, so what? Loss is a
basic fact of entrepreneurial life. Four out of five
new restaurants that open in Manhattan this year
will probably fail within two years; yet we do not
ban new restaurants. We generally believe that
social gain accrues when people take entrepreneurial risks, even if some individuals incur
losses. The same applies to takeovers. And isn't it
curious that the new state statutes give target

shareholders more protection, when the only
victim is the bidder shareholder?
Let me move from what we know about
takeovers to what we do not know. We do not
know what motivates bidders. The source of
takeover gains has long been a mystery. Certainly some managerial theories about perverse
incentives seem plausible. But there is a new debate brewing among economists. Financial economists, on the one hand, do stock price studies,
and they invariably find that, on balance, target
stocks rise. Industrial organization economists,
on the other hand, study the assets of the target
firm, one to three years after a takeover. They
find no evidence that target assets are better
managed after takeovers. Their findings are
strongly inconsistent with the view that bad managers are being replaced by better managers.
So we have a puzzle. Shareholders clearly
gain, yet there is no evidence that the assets are
better managed. Although there are many problems with defining the criteria for better management, we can conclude that shareholder
gains do not necessarily translate into social
gains.
It is possible that other people are losing.
The most likely candidates-aside from creditors, who can protect themselves-are probably
managers, particularly middle managers who are
not usually the beneficiaries of golden parachutes. I am not arguing for legislative protection, but I probably am arguing for greater tolerance for self-help remedies, such as the newly
popular tin parachute. This is a direct self-help
response to the problems that arise in this rather
unstable world.
Another such response is the leveraged
buyout. I believe that the leveraged buyout will
become more and more frequent, and that increasingly hostile takeovers will be the precipitating force. What seems to be moving takeovers
in the last five years is negative synergy, that is,
the creation of value from breaking up conglomerate firms.
PROF. WEIDENBAUM: Jack Coffee is letting
off the hook too easily the prevailing finance literature on takeovers, exemplified by Michael
Jensen's widely cited article in The Harvard Business Review. This article, and others in its tradition, refer to event studies as science, and to everything else as fiction. The data showing that
target shareholders gain are said to be sound.
The data showing that bidder shareholders lose
AEI JOURNAL ON GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY

25

CORPORATE TAKEOVERS

are said to need further examination. They then
firmly conclude that the economy benefits because takeovers are good for shareholders.
This has been the prevailing view in the economic finance literature. I am glad to see it becoming more reasonable, but let us not let those
guys wiggle off the hook so easily.
MR. GRUNDFEST: As an attorney and an
economist, I would like to come to Jack Coffee's
defense. We do not observe strong gains among
bidders the way we do among targets. However,
there are some fascinating patterns in the data.
They suggest that market processes work in an
evolutionary fashion to discipline acquisitors
who engage in transactions that fail to add value
in the marketplace.
Researchers at the Securities and Exchange
Commission have discovered that aggregate data
describing bidder returns mask significant differences within the population of bidders. In other
words, while the average stock price effect on
bidders' shares is close to zero, there are bidders
with statistically significant negative returns and
bidders with statistically significant positive returns. The bad bidders, those whose stock prices
fall as a consequence of acquisition announcements, often become good targets themselves as
the market later tries to undo their nonproductive acquisitions. These failed acquisitions often
involve conglomerate strategies in which the
buyer adds little, if any, operating value to the
target firm. The market's subsequent attempts to
discipline these transactions are often criticized
as bust-up transactions even though they add
economic value by creating more rational corporate forms involving less so-called conglomerate
overhead.
Mergers and acquisitions are risky propositions. There is a Schumpeterian process at work
as the market throws out the failures and tries to
reward the successes. The problem with much
of the legislation in the takeover area is that it
would stop the operation of this evolutionary
process. We would be trying to protect the failures, and at a very high price.
PROE WEIDENBAUM: We agree on the
public policy implications. No quarrel there.
PROE ROMANO: Let me add a further wrinkle on the issue Murray Weidenbaum raises concerning the shareholders of acquisitors. A number of studies have found insignificant returns

26

REGULATION, 1988 NUMBER I

for bidders. This is not completely surprising.
Competition among bidders reduces rents. Unless there were some unique synergies for a bidding firm, one would not expect a large positive
return. More troubling is a finding of negative
returns. Jensen argues-and I agree-that accounting data, which are used in the industrial
organization literature, are unreliable. Accounting data can be a very poor measure of economically relevant information. Such data, for example, showed railroad companies doing well
before they went into bankruptcy. So I understand the desire to use market price data as opposed to just accounting returns.
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"Say, isn't your company owned by the
SAME COMPANY that owns mine?"

With respect to Murray's argument about
boards, boards may not always be able to do
what a bidder can. An interesting study by Randall M0rck at the University of Alberta, and
Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny at the University of Chicago's Graduate School of Business
bears on this. They found that when boards fire
managers, the firms were doing poorly relative
to their own healthy industry. But the targets of
hostile takeovers are in industries that are doing
poorly relative to the market.
I do not know how much to make of this, but
it would suggest that boards can tell if their company is doing well compared to their competition. When the whole industry is doing poorly,
a hostile bidder may be more effective than the
board at breaking existing contracts with the
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work force, and taking other steps necessary to
revive the firm.
I do not understand why management cannot do that itself, so I have mixed feelings about
such a thesis. But even if we accept that view it is
still possible to agree with Murray that boards
can be better monitors of what management is
doing.
PROF. COFFEE: We have hard data on bidders incurring significant negative stock reactions. This cannot go on forever. Bidders themselves may become the targets of hostile takeovers, a self-corrective response. Alternatively,
boards may see a few vivid lessons and become
more aggressive. I do not dispute anything that
Murray said about directors being more aggressive. But that is an hortatory prescription, and I
am not optimistic about it having a meaningful
impact.
Why are bidder returns dropping to a negative level? Partly because, as Roberta Romano
mentioned, we have a much more competitive
market for corporate control. Most takeovers today result in multiple bids which compete away
the rents.
But this would lead only to insignificant returns. What we may have here is a possibility
raised by Professor Richard Roll, the hubris hypothesis, also called "the winner's curse." The
person who wins an auction may well be cursed
because he paid more than everyone else was
willing to pay. He may have paid more because
he had unique synergy gains available only to
him, but he may just have been too optimistic.
One other point. Bidders that are incurring
losses tend to be large corporate bidders. But
bidders that break up firms and sell them off
have not had losses. Ronald Perelman, for example, after taking over Revlon, broke up the company, paid off the junk bonds, and wound up
with 40 percent of the assets absolutely free. This
kind of negative synergy takeover is likely to continue. It will probably also precipitate more leveraged buyouts, because what bidders can do,
managements can also do once they are under
the gun.
One last point. It would be interesting to
look at differences between the American and
the English systems. In England, when Hanson
Trust finances a takeover, it does not use junk
bonds, but typically makes a subscription offering. English bidders in takeovers offer their own
stock or use cash. That introduces some market

discipline: if the market thinks the bidder is paying too much, or has a history of making overpriced acquisitions, the subscription offering
will flop.
This equity subscription process has been
very successful. English takeovers may have pro-

The person who wins an auction may
well be cursed because he paid more
than everyone else was willing to pay.

duced less of a winner's curse. I am not suggesting legislation of any kind, but it is interesting to
see how a different system may have an internal
brake.
MR. GRUNDFEST: There are substantial
variations in patterns of bidder gains. It makes a
big difference whether the bidders are specialists
in the business, dabblers, or conglomerateurs;
whether they are large or small; whether the
deals are done for cash, as swaps, or as equity
subscriptions. Even though the findings are preliminary, some trends are emerging. I suspect,
for example, that the more subject the bidder is
to market discipline, the greater are his gains.
Cash deals are more subject to market discipline
than swaps and thus may be correlated with superior performance.
Also stock prices often increase significantly
when CEOs die. This "morbidity effect" occurs
because problem CEOs are often perceived by
the market as having hung around too long.
When they die, stockholders often feel relieved.
Two examples often cited in the popular press
are Gulf and Western, and Resorts International,
where the CEOs passed away unexpectedly and
stock prices rose remarkably. This confirms
Murray Weidenbaum's observation that boards
do not always effectively discipline managers.
ROBERT H. MALOTT: I am the Chairman
and CEO of the FMC Corporation. All of you have
talked about the short-range value of takeovers
to the seller, to the buyer, or to the shareholder,
but I did not hear any of you address whether in
the long run the takeover movement is positive
or negative. Is the economy better off for having
Phillips, Union Carbide, Borg-Warner, or other
companies go through this process? Are those
companies better off?
AEI JOURNAL ON GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY
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PROF. WEIDENBAUM: I have a few observations, but no definitive answers to your
questions.
First, I would have to say that Phillips and
Unocal-their shareholders and maybe the industry-would have been better off if they had
sold out to Boone Pickens. I do not think you
can blame Pickens for the heavy debt load those
two companies have. In the case of Phillips, it
was a decision to perpetuate the management
and to protect the community.
Second, it is hard to translate takeover battles into reduced performance on the part of
American industry. I know there are many examples of companies forced to think and act shortterm, but look at the aggregate data on research
and development. In the 1980s, just as the takeover trend has accelerated, the private sector has
displaced the federal government as the primary
source of funding for research and development.
This is a very encouraging shift, and it shows the
long-term orientation of American business as a
whole.
PROF. ROMANO: I agree with Murray
Weidenbaum on this issue. Studies by the Office
of the Chief Economist of the SEC and by
Bronwyn Hall of the University of California at
Berkeley have found that acquisitions do not
have a negative effect on research and development expenditures. The SEC study also found
that the market placed a positive value on announcements of long-term investments such as
research and development.

MR. GRUNDFEST: I think Mr. Malott's question deserves a direct answer.
The question is whether all of these takeovers and restructurings are really good for the
economy. The answer is that I can imagine more
civil and less costly ways of achieving these
restructurings where the investment bankers'
and lawyers' fees would be lower, and where
there would be less grief. But, given the way we
do it today, is restructuring beneficial? Absolutely. Some of your own examples illustrate
why.
Take the oil industry. If ever you saw a situation of screaming disequilibrium, it was the oil
industry in the early 1980s. You could buy oil for
$6 or $7 a barrel on the New York Stock Exchange and, at the same time, companies were
investing in drilling projects that made sense
only if the price of oil were to rise to $35 or $40 a
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barrel. That is disequilibrium in anybody's book.
The companies taken over usually had bloated
exploration budgets and were not very effective
in finding new oil. I do not want to say that hindsight is the right way to judge anything. But in
this case the market's judgment was right.
PROF. COFFEE: There are multiple perspectives on the assertion that bust-up takeovers occur because the liquidation value of assets substantially exceeds the market value.
In the "go-go" market of the 1960s, two
small companies could somehow be put together
into a conglomerate to produce positive synergy.
Oliver Williamson, the leading theorist in this
area, explained why the conglomerate was an efficient response to market conditions then.
Today the market believes that the conglomerate is an inefficient dinosaur. Substantial market pressure forces companies to define more
narrowly their products and services, and their
area of special competence. Even companies not
threatened by takeovers are selling off their peripheral activities in a belief that the stock market will value them more highly if they focus on
their core business.
What is behind that? One possibility is negative synergy. Somehow the large conglomerate
has gone beyond its most efficient or optimal
span of control. Another possibility is the free
cash flow theory, which maintains that managers
of conglomerates cross-subsidize their losing division with profits from profitable divisions.
Spinning off divisions disciplines managers.
I see no great social harm in reducing the
span of activities of the large conglomerate. That
is occurring, and would be occurring even without the takeover. Exxon, for example, is repurchasing shares even though it does not feel
threatened by takeovers.
I think the takeover is the most powerful
force toward this shrinkage. The downside is that
takeovers disturb the nexus of contracts that
used to exist in the firm, disrupting some of the
implicit contracts that bound managers to firms
and gave them reasonable expectations of lifetime employment. Managers are now in a much
more unsettled world.

MR. DeMUTH: I would like to ask the panel
whether there are any areas of potential abuse or
other problems that warrant attention from legislators. Can you identify areas that require public policy intervention?
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MR. GRUNDFEST: Our system today is far
from perfect and much can be done to improve
it. The most important improvements may involve a shift away from across-the-board rules
that regulate all corporations identically, and toward a system of self-determination that allows
each company's stockholders and management
an opportunity to define the rules under or by
which it will respond to takeover proposals.
We must have a flexible system that can
reach judgments on a case-by-case basis. The
government must look toward "private ordering," where the interests involved in the operation of the corporation can establish for themselves rules of governance and patterns of
behavior that define how corporations will be
taken over. I can see no reason for making the
rules for takeovers the same for every corporation in the United States.
PROF. ROMANO: Let me reemphasize what
Jack Coffee mentioned. We really do not have a
good theory of acquisitions. With limited understanding, we should be very hesitant about enacting federal laws to affect acquisitions. There are
at present several varieties of state takeover laws.
If we knew what the ideal statute was, then there
would be more uniformity as all of the states
would have adopted it.
PROF. COFFEE: Is there a potential for
abuse? We have focused on shareholders. I agree
with the rest of the panel that shareholders are
not being abused. In fact, they are making out
like bandits. Takeovers increase shareholder
wealth tremendously. Self-help or private-ordering remedies such as the fair price charter
amendments, the poison pill-if approved by
stockholders, and the super-majority provisions
can promote stockholder interests. The increasingly competitive market for control under
which a low bid simply triggers an auction also
protects them: the greatest defense against
exploitation through inadequate tender offers is
that someone else will make a higher tender offer. We have seen a very competitive pro-auction
policy in this area. The Williams Act, in effect,
facilitates auctions by stretching out the time
period.
From this standpoint, shareholders do not
appear to be abused. That is the irony-every reform proposal that we see today, including the
15 state statutes that have been passed just since
April, are premised on the myth that sharehold-

ers need protection. The problem is excessive
defense, not inadequate tender offers.
WILLARD C. BUTCHER: I am the Chairman
and CEO of Chase Manhattan Bank. In this discussion, we have spent a lot of time focusing on
whether takeovers enhance shareholder value. I
would just submit that the shareholder is not the
owner, but a speculative renter.
When we think of owners, we might imagine
a 19th-century mill owner in New England who
had a long-term responsibility not only to the
company but also to the community. Today we
have institutional investors. If directors or managers consider only their own interests, they will
sell out on every single takeover offer that enhances shareholder value.
It seems to me that shareholder value is not
the issue. I represent a company that was incorporated before corporation law. I recently read
the charter, and nowhere does it mention enhancing shareholder value. We have a broader
societal issue here: what is really good for building economic capability in the country? That is
why we have corporation laws in the first place.
It is not just an issue of enhancing shareholders.
Are we better off because there is no St.
Regis Paper or Continental Can Company? Is the
economy basically better off?
I have not heard much about that. If it were
merely a case of enhancing shareholder value,
every CEO in this country nearing retirement
would put his company into play. Their stock options would be worth a great deal more. And yet
they do not do that. I do not want to attach either
noble or stupid motives to CEOs. But there are
broader issues.
PROF. COFFEE: I think there is something
in what you are saying. Maybe you have stated it
too broadly, though, by focusing on institutional
investors.
You mentioned St. Regis disappearing. I
think there is a danger of reifying companies and
treating them as the real players. We have to decompose the corporation and look at its various
constituents-creditors, employees, managers,
and shareholders, only some of whom are institutional investors. Institutional investors are often pension plans such as the California State
Teachers' Retirement Plan. People are ultimately the beneficiaries of these gains. These
gains flow through institutions.
(Continued on page 47)
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(Continued from page 29)
I admit that shareholder gains do not necessarily equal social gains. But to say takeovers are
bad, we have to find a clear loser because we
know someone is benefiting. The only possible
losers are managers and employees. I have argued at great length elsewhere that the tin parachute is something the court should show great
tolerance because with very generous programs
of tin parachutes there need not be any clear
losers.
PROE ROMANO: Let me say two things in
response. First, I do not think all firms can be
profitably taken over, and not every CEO, when
nearing retirement, can find someone who can
profitably pay a lot more for the firm.
Second, we focus on enhancing shareholder
value because when looking at a corporation, it
is difficult to conceive of who else's interests
would be appropriate for determining the efficient allocation of resources in the economy.
For instance, the literature suggests that firms
that are worker-owned rather than shareholderowned, such as Yugoslavian firms, do not end up
with the most efficient allocation of resources.
Workers appear to have far shorter time horizons than investors. In fact, in the U.S. plywood
industry, where we have workers' cooperatives,
workers hire managers and these firms look a lot
like corporations with outside non-management
shareholders.
MR. GRUNDFEST: I agree with Mr. Butcher's observation that the modern role of the
shareholder is very different from the 19th-century role of the owner in a closed corporation.
Corporations raise capital from a variety of
sources: by borrowing money, by selling preferred stock, or by selling common stock. These
various sources of capital exercise different types
of control over management.
Nobody says, "Here, have some money, have
fun." Bond holders lend money and in return get
covenants that protect them. Preferred shareholders have other protections. Common stockholders are most at the mercy of the decisions
made by management. The board must vote to
give them dividends. They are the ones with the
residual claims that have value after everybody
else has been paid off.
I think we are seeing a change in the technology of finance that has increased the power of
the shareholder in corporate control. After many

years of neglect, the shareholders are revolting
against a system that has not rewarded their risk
and investment as well as it could have.
Is the only role of the corporation to enhance shareholder value? Of course not. That
would never work. To enhance shareholder
value, you have to have satisfied workers and
good products, and you have to make a profit.
Nobody will invest in a corporation whose workers are on strike all the time or who do not produce quality products. I believe that in corporations in which management is doing a bad job,
workers and stockholders are hurt.
Consider the automobile industry. Honda
and other companies are building cars in the
United States for export to Japan. The capital investment in those plants is a fraction of the investment that General Motors has made in many
of its facilities over the last few years. Who has
been hurt in General Motors? The workers and
the stockholders. If you help the workers, you
will help the stockholders. If you help the stockholders properly, you will definitely help the
workers. It is a cooperative situation, not a competitive one.
I disagree with Jack Coffee about one thing:
tin parachutes. Tin parachutes are hypocritical.
A tin parachute says that if I, senior management, get fired or lose my job in a hostile takeover, you, middle management and lower level
employees, will get tremendous severance benefits at the expense of the stockholders. However,
if I keep my job but decide to restructure the corporation, you get nothing-and the stockholders
lose nothing. It is a hostage strategy, pure and
simple. I think those types of strategies will not,
in the long run, serve management's interests.
They will increase pressure at the federal level
for job security legislation, for plant closing legislation, and for rules against laying people off
under a wide variety of circumstances. The regulators' rationale will be that we are not doing
anything that management was not willing to
promise anyway.
PROE COFFEE: In several airlines, the pilots' and machinists' unions are negotiating for a
right of first refusal to take over the company. At
United, the new collective bargaining agreement
terminates in the event of a takeover. That is not
purely a case of management putting in a poison
pill. That is the union's own self-interested position. Faced with a new level of job insecurity,
workers want the ability to renegotiate.
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If we see a potential for opportunism, we for the bottom": the competition between the
should be sympathetic to new contracting ar- states to loosen corporate regulation and thus to
rangements which try to reduce the prospect for attract more corporations. Delaware was-and
opportunism, such as by giving some kind of is-winning this competition.
The classic statement in support of regulatakeover-related severance benefits. I think we
will see more of this. Without legislation, and I tion by states, which permits competition among
am certainly not urging any, we will see new regulations, was Ralph K. Winter's response to
contracts involving employee unions, particu- Cary. This was expanded into a book, Governlarly in industries like the airlines.
ment and the Corporation, published by the
American Enterprise Institute in 1978. Winter
MR. GRUNDFEST: I understand how you identified a crucial flaw in Cary's analysis. He
could say that these new contracts just reaffirm suggested that the race was to the top, not to the
the preexisting arrangements. However, in some bottom. Cary had overlooked the fact that firms
industries, wages are way out of line with the operate in many markets, including the capital,
wage costs encountered by new entrants. Some- product, and corporate-control markets. Each of
one can hire a group of pilots at far less than they these constrains managers from operating under
are being paid at their current airline jobs, lease a suboptimal legal regime for, as Winter argued,
a fleet of planes, and be in the airline business, firms in non-value maximizing legal regimes will
competing at lower costs. This reflects a funda- be outperformed by those operating under value
mental disequilibrium in the industry. To the ex- maximizing laws. They will have lower stock
tent this type of renegotiation takes place, prices, subjecting their managers to the possibilputting contingent claims on an existing firm, ity of replacement by a successful bidder who
losses are shifted from workers to the stockhold- can increase firm value by changing domicile.
Managers have an incentive-job protection
ers and other people with capital claims on the
corporation. This increases the cost of capital in or preservation-to opt for the legal regime that
these industries. In this process, losses are never shareholders prefer, the one that maximizes the
value of the firm. Accordingly, states have an ineliminated-they are merely shifted.
centive to offer value maximizing laws: doing so
PROF. COFFEE: Are you suggesting that if increases revenues by attracting corporations
the union and the existing management reach from other states.
Since Cary's and Winter's papers were writsuch an agreement, you would invalidate it?
ten, we have accumulated much empirical eviMR. GRUNDFEST: Absolutely not. The point dence on the effects of state competition. If state
I am making is that these contracts will be unsta- competition truly harms shareholders, we
ble unless the participants also address the un- should expect the stock prices of firms that
derlying economic changes that induce the re- change their state of incorporation to drop. Yet
using conventional financial econometric technegotiation.
niques, several studies have found the opposite:
PROF. COFFEE: We have not seen stability such firms had either statistically significant inin the takeover field since the very first takeover. creases or no significant change in their stock
prices. No study has found a negative stock price
PROF. ROMANO: It is important not to for- effect-that is, any shareholder wealth lossget the context in which the controversy over from reincorporating.
Do states compete for incorporation busitakeovers and the demand for their regulation
arises. In our federal system of government, cor- ness? As innovations in corporation codes spread
porate law is under the jurisdiction of the states. across the states, there is evidence of a positive
We have dual jurisdiction of takeovers, however, correlation between a state's responsiveness and
through the Williams Act, which is part of the the percentage of its revenues received from
federal securities laws. The modern debate over franchise taxes. My own research has sought to
who should regulate corporations, and hence explain Delaware's continued success in the corcorporate takeovers, was launched by William porate charter market. As a measure of its sucCary's 1974 article on federalism and corporate cess, consider these figures. In a sample of about
law in the Yale Law Journal. Cary called for fed- 700 firms that changed their state of incorporaeral regulation to end what he termed "the race tion between 1961 and 1983, 82 percent moved
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to Delaware. Slightly more than half of Fortune's
top 200 manufacturing firms are in Delaware.
Firms, particularly those that go to Delaware, relocate when they anticipate engaging in
certain types of transactions, such as public offerings, mergers and acquisitions, or defensive
tactics against takeovers. These transactions increase the likelihood of shareholder litigation.
The cost of such transactions can be reduced under a new legal regime.
After a firm incorporates in a particular jurisdiction, the state can change or fail to update
its code when other states innovate; relocating
would be costly for the firm. This leaves firms
vulnerable to opportunistic behavior by states.
To be able to charge a premium for chartering in its jurisdiction, a state must guarantee that
it will not be opportunistic, that it will continue
to respond to the firm's demands. Delaware receives a large proportion of revenues from the
franchise tax: from 1960 to 1980, franchise taxes

management personnel, resulting in a very
strong potential for conflict of interest between
managers and shareholders over the success of a
bid. Even here, though, I think the cautiousness
of Delaware's approach provides some encouraging support for state competition. The extensive deliberative process in Delaware produced a
law that is less restrictive of bidders than the
laws of other states.
The problem is highlighted by the legislative
process of takeover laws, which leaves much to
be desired. State takeover laws are typically promoted by the Chamber of Commerce at the behest of a major local corporation that is, or fears
it will be, the target of a hostile bid. The urgency
of the firm's situation leads to rapid, sometimes
overnight, enactment of legislation with little or
no public debate. In fact, this is one feature that
differentiates Delaware from other states. Delaware has such a large and diverse corporate constituency, including bidders as well as targets,
that no one firm's management has the clout to
get a bill passed overnight.
I think a damning feature of the recent state
Managers have an incentive-job proteclegislation is that it codifies defensive strategies
tion or preservation-to opt for the legal
that firms could already have adopted volunregime that shareholders prefer, the one
tarily by charter amendment. The difference bethat maximizes the value of the firm.
tween "self-help" and the legislation is that selfhelp requires a shareholder vote of approval; the
vast majority of state takeover laws, on the other
averaged about 16 percent of state revenues .. hand, cover firms unless they opt out, allowing
This high percentage guarantees continued managers to avoid obtaining their shareholders'
responsiveness because Delaware has no readily consent.
The way these laws are enacted leaves me
available alternative source of revenue. In addition, many of Delaware's citizens earn substan- with a nagging suspicion that the managers protial income by servicing Delaware corporations. moting them believe that their shareholders' apOther states, such as New York and California, proval would be harder to obtain than their legiscollect more from the franchise tax in absolute lators'. There may be good cause for such a
dollar terms, but only about 1 percent or less of concern. The available empirical evidence on
the effects of state takeover laws does not protheir budget.
Delaware also has invested in intangible as- mote confidence in their value maximizing qualsets that have no use outside the chartering busi- ities. Studies find that these laws have either a
ness. These assets, loosely called "legal capital," negative stock price effect or an insignificant efare a stock of legal precedents and judicial and fect on share prices of firms incorporated in
administrative expertise in corporate law. This those states. If state takeover laws really increase
legal capital commits Delaware to being respon- shareholder welfare, we would expect to see a
sive. Delaware also has a first-mover advantage, positive return to the affected firms. As in the
making it difficult for another state to compete case of reincorporations, although the data are
successfully by, for instance, offering the same not conclusive, they are relatively one-sided.
code as Delaware but at a lower tax rate.
If there is an area of state regulation to
Admittedly, state takeover laws are the laws worry about, therefore, it is takeovers. This does
that are most troubling to proponents, like my- not mean that preemption by federal regulation
self, of a state system. The reason is that changes is the answer. Most of the bills introduced in
in control are often accompanied by changes in Congress rival the proposals before state legislaAEI JOURNAL ON GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY
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tures in attempting to restrict bids. There are mands of the intensely vocal managers, the benesome differences in the constituencies at the na- ficiaries of the regulation, over the interest of the
tional level and those at the state level: the for- diffuse population of shareholders. This serious
mer include the SEC, the securities industry, and problem of public misperception must be recogsome organized groups of investors. But it does nized and addressed before anyone can optimisnot strike me that laws emanating from the U.S. tically embrace federal preemption of state takeCongress would necessarily be much different, over laws.
let alone better.
So while our positions on the efficacy of
MR. GRUNDFEST: The takeover battle has tratakeovers probably differ greatly, I agree with ditionally been fought in Washington, DC, before
Murray Weidenbaum that the best way to deal • the House and Senate committees that have direct oversight over the securities laws, and before the SEC. Within the last month, this has
changed dramatically. The battle is about to be
With federal regulation, we lose the edge
fought in Wilmington, Delaware, not Washingof responsiveness to changing circumton, DC.
stances, the key element in an efficient
The move from Washington to Wilmington
system of state competition.
was precipitated by a decision of the United
States Supreme Court in the CTS case, which, to
the surprise of many observers, upheld an antiwith corporate activities is through the parties' takeover statute adopted by the State of Indiana
private contractual arrangements. If sharehold- (CTS Corporation v. Dynamics Corporation of
ers of a firm want to restrict their firm's ability to America, 107 S.Ct. 1637, 1987). This statute rereceive a bid, that is fine. They should place quired referendum approval from fellow stockthose restrictions in their charters. I am leery of holders before anyone who sought to acquire
the economic consequences of increased inter- stock beyond certain thresholds could exercise
the accompanying voting rights.
vention in corporate governance.
But if we have to have government regulaThis decision breathed new life into the state
tion, state regulation is preferable to federal anti-takeover movement. Since the CTS deciregulation. With federal regulation, we lose the sion, approximately 15 states have adopted antiedge of responsiveness to changing circumstan- takeover statutes of various forms. The latest,
ces, the key element in an efficient system of and by far the most significant, proposal is under
state competition. Given the size of its budget, consideration in Delaware. Under Delaware's
the federal government has no revenue incentive proposed statute, if you are involved in a hostile
to meet firms' desires. And corporate law, which takeover and do not acquire 90 percent of the
deals with the relationships between sharehold- target corporation's shares, then you cannot eners and managers, is hardly a salient election is- gage in certain self-dealing transactions for three
sue at the national level. It is hard to believe that years. Among other things, you cannot merge the
an unresponsive member of Congress would suf- acquired corporation into any other corporation
fer immediate adverse reelection consequences; in which you have a sufficiently large interest,
a Delaware legislator who suddenly shifted his or and you cannot sell the assets to a corporation
her position on corporate law would.
that is one of your affiliates.
Most members of the public, as consumers
A very significant debate is brewing as to
and workers, stand to gain from a strong take- whether this will really limit takeover activity, or
over process and from the efficient allocation of whether the statute has so many loopholes that
resources that occurs when firms are being run takeover lawyers and investment bankers would
in the shareholders' interests. Yet the sentiment need only about a week to figure out a way
expressed in public opinion polls is negative to- around it. I do not know the answer.
ward mergers and takeovers. Maybe the poll reMR. DeMUTH: How does the panel see the
sults are misleading. We all know the imporstate
takeover legislation playing out?
tance of framing survey questions for the
responses that are elicited. But as long as this
mistaken view prevails, federal legislators would
PROF. COFFEE: The Delaware statute will
be under strong pressure to support the de- cause only a mild chill. Even before that law, the
SO
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"Bandits at two o'clock, Mr. Feldon!"
Drawing by M. Stevens;© 1988 The New Yorker Magazine, Inc.

bidder typically wanted to acquire 80 percent of
the target for tax reasons: at that level or above,
intracorporate dividends are tax exempt. If the
bidder acquires 85 percent, the new Delaware
statute is inapplicable. Even when it applies, all
the bidder is prohibited from doing is selling the
assets to himself, merging with himself, or lending to himself. But he can sell the company in
one piece to a third party or auction off a hundred pieces to a hundred different parties, and
pay out the proceeds as dividends on a pro rata
basis. And the bidder can keep on buying stock
up to the 100 percent level. Once the buyer takes
control and buys more stock, he will eventually
cause a delisting of the company. Once the company is delisted and illiquid, the shareholders
will sell to him because there is no other gain: he
may even have suspended earlier dividends.
There is a coercion potential there at least.
The Delaware law will also change the strategy for executing takeovers. We will see more
100 percent bids and fewer partial ones. We will
see many bids conditioned on getting 85 percent
control because then the statute does not apply.

So the short answer is that all that really
counts for most of the New York Stock Exchange
companies is Delaware, and I think Delaware has
taken a deliberately cosmetic position. The statute does something, but not much.
MR. GRUNDFEST: I disagree with Jack Coffee about the likely consequences of the Delaware statute.
If raiders use those tactics, they will generally be perceived as squeeze-out tactics-very
unfair and heavy-handed. The next generation of
legislation could easily close those loopholes. To
use the loopholes could be to doom them.
EDITORS' NOTE: Delaware adopted its antitakeover statute in February 1988. In accord with
certain suggestions made by Commissioner
Grundfest, the statute was amended to provide for
an exemption for any bidder who obtained 85 percent of a target's shares, excluding shares held by
the target's management or controlled by certain
pension plans that vote shares at management's
direction.
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